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I wonder if the crew was perhaps unaware as they left the port that they were operating on the HR1/LR1 branch of the electrical system. Perhaps they were unaware of the specifics of the previous day's blackouts and believed they were still operating on the HR2/LR2 side, therefore unknowingly reset the side that had just failed.

Are these airshows worth all the lives that are lost?

The whole thing stinks. I don't believe them.

Thank you very much for this deep Dive into the Reasons for this Accident!🙂👍

The cross-wind component had to be a known (but negligible?) factor in the steering inputs.

I thought there were separate engines for close-in movement. Side thrusters.. An aside, the word is buss, not bus.

I was an engineer in electrical power plants for 40 years. Double ended switchgear would swap automatically between feeds. Strange they don't do this in marine applications.

Looking at the schematic is it possible that the Bow Thrusters remained energised?

Thank you for a great explanation of a complicated system and emergency. I enjoy your channel,former Saftey Petty Officer VA-215 U.S.N.

Fascinating, in a morbid sort of way.

A good presentation, it's a complex system and you were in a hurry(?). The HV and LV mains are all polyphase not DC.

It is easy to be wise sitting in the having coffee. But during discussion. The thought was the fault might be with Transformer 1. As both high and low voltage circuit breakers tripped. Possibly the transformer oil may have been contaminated with water. This may have caused electrical arcing inside the transformer. Which can produce Acetylene gas. Protective devices inside the transformer would then shut off the power to the transformer. In electric locomotives routine transformer oil samples are taken to detect both water and gas build up.

I work in engine manufacturing and I am quite surprised that water and oil pumps are driven by a different generator than the serviced engine itself. We mount all water and oil pumps directly to the free-end gear. I'm talking of 4S engines, but still... the principle is always to keep the engine running as much as possible even in case of system failure or underperformance.

What boggles the mind is that after such a major incident, it only takes them only a handful of seconds to clear SWA2830 for takeoff on runway 1 *that crosses runway 4*

JUAN BROWN

Key Bridge

Cyber attack.. Why are all the grew still onboard? What about the 2 minutes of lost data?. How did Biden know what caused the crash before anyone investigated it? What about fill right rudder if the rudder was centered !!!! Nothing makes any sense It's unbelievable... And I don't.... Believe it...

👍👍👍👍👍👍👍😬😯🙏👌

There is absolutely no-good reason for main propulsion to self-shutdown the instant that the cooling pump quit. How would all of you pilots like an aircraft with an engine that shuts down automatically with a high CHT etc. This main engine is at the lowest power setting it stands to reason that it can operate for a short while without water cooling (or oil per the second power outage). The ships pilot should have the option to keep the main engine running when the ship is in a critical operation. Six people were killed due to a system that made preserving an engine the priority.

On the basis of the diagram and your description, this is a remarkably simple system and not akin to that on a commercial aircraft at all. On an aircraft there are multiple busses each of which is capable of powering all the essential systems. Switching between them is automatic and quick. Here there appears to be one HV and one LV buss. Both need to be operating for the engine to run yet, from what you say there needs to be manual intervention to switch to the alternative LV supply transformer. Does that mean someone has to run down to a switch room? If it does then there is going to be a significant time delay on a large vessel during which the accident can have happened or become (as here) inevitable. Do vessels like this have checklists for problem resolution in the way aircraft do? Is this why the mistake of not immediately switching to the second transformer occurred? The question for the ship owners has to be why is the emergency generator incapable of running the rudder AND the oil and water pumps to keep the engine running? I feel that the main take-away from this disaster is that extremely heavy vessels should not be allowed to go under relatively flimsy bridges that have little or no protection against any vessel running into them. The Baltimore port authority has chosen to take these vessels without ensuring that the channel and its bridges are sufficiently sturdy and safe to withstand a very heavy run-away vessel coming into contact.

There seems to be a shocking lack of redundancy in these systems.

Great Video 👏🏾 question? Why isn’t there enough emphasis on hand flying the aircraft in flight school? Straight up Stick and Rudder. On any aircraft more importantly on small aircraft? Automation can fail if it’s relied upon to much. Do you think if he would’ve hand flown the plane and got down to the minimum altitude, that he could’ve made it safely or should he have immediately diverted to a nearby Airport like Palm Springs. Just trying to weight the options because this can happen to anyone in a small aircraft.. RIP to this Pilot.

These "Main Bus" feeder breakers have "instantaneous trip" settings to guard against damage during fault current failures. They need to be "coordinated" so the down stream breaker will trip before the up-stream/main breaker trips. The fact that HR1 and LR1 BOTH tripped would tend to indicate this was never done on this system. The issues that occurred within the electrical system a day or two prior to departing were not "electrical" related failures. They were fuel system and mechanical/crew failures. Doesn't shed a very good light on the crew competency but if the fuel pressure issue was adequately addressed, there would be no "known" reason to delay the departure. Lots of "in depth" investigating needs to be done on this electrical system to explain why HR1 and LR1 both tripped, why the emergency generator breaker tripped, the trip settings I mention above, and why the crew re-closed two main feeder breakers that has just tripped instead of leaving them open and closing the two breakers @ TR2??

The bridge was a mess after long time of political negligence, so this was probably the quickest way to get a good bridge again. Talk about mess, the crew sounds like a solid one.

NTSB is gonna be even more busy than with just the MV Dali under investigation. This time a barge hit a bridge, collapsed a single span (not sure if anyone on the bridge got hurt), and the barge leaked oil into the river. Would love to see if you can get more info on that, all I saw was a short blurb on the morning news!

Wild. That's open sea safety vs CQM. Wild.

As a retired Electrician, I totally agree with your analysis and thinking about re-setting a main feeder breaker that has just tripped out. Especially when both the HV (high voltage) and LV (low voltage) breaker on either side of a major step down transformer BOTH tripped. For me, and my work experience, I would immediately suspect a major fault within that major transformer and would NEVER reset the HV breaker and re-energize that transformer before it was tested for faults. All of that said, it certainly seems like they were already so close to the bridge pier that even if they had initially closed HR2 and LR2 instead of re-closing HR1 and LR1, they would not have had time to re-start the engine and get things under control fast enough to avoid contacting the bridge pier.

So the safety features to save a 30 million engine put a half a billion dollar bridge at risk

How could you consider a vessel of this size seaworthy if it has a history of electrical faults? Circuit breakers cut off for a reason, not because they are in a bad mood. No adult supervision on the Dali?

Obviously, there's a fault in the high voltage system. These two breakers, HV and LV, automatically open when power supplied to them is lost. This prevents accidentally getting electrocuted, reverse flow through the transformers, and prevents phasing issues between systems. Since the systems continued functioning after the accident (propulsion engine excluded), I would look to the high voltage propulsion systems for the issue. The main engine appears to directly drive the propeller, so it isn't the issue itself. I would look at the oil pumps, air compressors, and whatever high load systems are on the high voltage side. The likelihood of both transformers or the busses before or after them being at fault would be rare. The emergency generator was started and continued to provide power to the low voltage systems, so there's no fault there, that would cause this accident. I don't know if this ship has a data recorder for individual components, but that would be a wise system to employ, to show any current spikes or variations in systems that would lead to loss of control of the vessel. I would employ similar designs to aircraft for these large ships (both cargo and passenger) to help avoid accidents and record all the data in the event of, for further improvements in safety. That's how we learn and make transportation safer for every mode (planes, trains, and automobiles). Yes, even your car records data and stores it for investigation (although they record for less time and are much less protected from damage). As far back as the late 90's, car computers stored data from a crash for insurance investigating. They could recall the last recorded speed, inputs for brake and accelerator, even if the seat belt was buckled. Tesla, being a tech company, can recall more data than anyone. I'm betting that it's all transmitted on the fly, as an intense fire would surely destroy any computer data on board. I'm not one for being tracked, so I'll stick to a less smart car (no wifi or Bluetooth) for a long as I can! 😅

@blancolirio Looks like a good case study for why Minimum Equipment List procedures are strictly enforced. At least in the aviation world. They reset the breakers that just tripped, but NOT the other side bus breakers indicating maybe they believed that side to already have some sort of preexisting issue?? Interesting that doing just that allowed them to restore power as intended. Which makes one wonder why they were so reticent to do it in the first place. Even so, it is doubtful that even if they would have immediately switched to the #2 side of the bus they still would not have had time to regain propulsion, and steering alone most likely would not have been enough to avert the collision.

It seems odd to me that the main has an external water pump and not internal... I'm a pilot on a Western river tow boat.. I have cats on my boat, one water pump for the main, one for the gear box... The more safety systems they add, the more risk of failure.. 46 years as a pilot... I appreciate all you do as I am a aviation enthusiastic person...

Hey Juan. Thanks for bringing an analysis on that accident. Interesting as all your videos. One question, though, if you allow me: what happened to that beautiful melody that was your "acoustic logo," and that was kinda bloncolirio I'd?

Why did ship turn to starboard and head directly for bridge piling?

Eeeesh...... Several no-brainers here ;- 1) What a lousy electrical set-up. Clearly, the steering gears power should be independently powered with it's OWN separate back-up - as well as a switchable link to the rest of the power system. 2) It's manifestly obvious that vastly-increased bridge-pier protection is needed ASAP. 3) It's also clear that the tugs should be mandated to stay with transiting vessles until clear of bridges etc. Less of a Swiss-Cheese, more of a colander....!!!!!

I got a tour of a USN vessel that showcased all the major ship systems. I was surprised (but probably shouldn't have been) at all the backup systems available. Nothing had more backups than the rudder. The last rudder backup was a completely manual system that required four or so really strong guys to manually operate some kind of winch/ratchet system that could move the rudder very slowly.

I'm not sure likening this ship to a modern airliner is helpful. There doesn't seem to be much useful redundancy in this ship's control system.

Even if they'd had LV bus energised immediately after engine shutdown, could the collision really have been avoided? A rudder can't turn a ship alone, it needs propeller to be pushing water over it to turn the ship. Additionally, if the screw has stopped, it is effectively blocking water from moving across the (very small) rudder, rendering it even more useless.

Florida would have the channel cleared and running normal in about a week. Wonder how long they can drag this out 5 years?

Why tf your mouse cursor so big 😭

The huge black smoke plume from the stack was not an indication of propulsion before striking pillar, nothing to see here folks don't believe your eyes😅😅😅

Those high voltage breakers require a lot of maintenance by qualified personnel.

Open question: How did loosing power translate into stearing off course (141°) ??? Note: 1) Streaing is impaired if there is no propeller wash/flow to redirect 2) If not external forces acted upon the ship, direction and speed is maintained

@ 12:13, why did the senior harbour pilot order 20 deg port rudder immediately after power failure? Is this why the coasting ship turned into the bridge dolphins?

Nice report. But why did the ship seemingly turn to starboard if there was no power to the rudder?

TR=Transformer. NOT Transformer Rectifier

Seems to me, although rare, the caption should be able to manually override the engines, so that they can run without water, or oil pressure, in very extreme conditions, like what happened at the bridge.

I would like to hear an explanation of why the ship suddenly turned to the right before loosing power.

Actually, as far as I can see, but stand to be corrected, there is a nonsense, or at least a hole, in the NTSB report. The initial blackout was caused by the main HR1 and LR1 trips opening. The crew closed these and power was restored to the HV and LV busses. However a little while later the D/G trips 3 and 4 opened, with consequent loss of all but emergency power. However HR1 and LR1 are still both apparently closed. Sensing D/G 3 and 4 going off the board, D/G 2 on standby connects to the board and it seem provides power to the HV bus. But if HR1 and LR1 are both closed it would also supply power to the LV bus. The report then says that the crew closed HR2 and LR2 so that D/G 2 could supply power to the LV bus. Something is wrong, missing or inconsistent in this description.

Seems like they don't have the redundancy that aircraft have. i.e., multiple busses powering the rudder.